

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
 OA/Box: Box 2
 File Folder: Gorbachev Visit [Washington Summit] (5)

Archivist: kdb
 FOIA ID: F2004-075, Hellerman
 Date: 08/03/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re preparing for the Summit, 4p <i>R 8/15/06 NLRR F04-075 #7</i>	n.d.	B1
2. list	re bilateral achievement (besides INF) for the Summit, 1p <i>R " " #8</i>	n.d.	B1
3. memo	H. Baker to Reagan re initial thoughts on a possible Gorbachev summit, 2p	9/11/87	B1
4. paper	Event Concept for Possible US-USSR Summit, 2p <i>R 11/9/06 NLRR F04-075 #9</i>	9/11/87	B1
5. memo (7658)	Thomas Griscom and Colin Powell to Chief of Staff, re invitation to Gorbachev (w/notations), 1p <i>R 11/9/06 NLRR F04-075 #10</i>	10/21/87	B1
	<i>R 11/9/06 NLRR F04-075 #11</i>		

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BAKER, HOWARD: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 2/27/2008

File Folder GORBACHEV VISIT [WASHINGTON SUMMIT] (5)

FOIA

F04-075

Box Number 2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
----	----------	----------------------	-------------	----------

1	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE PREPARING FOR THE SUMMIT [F04-075 #7]	4	ND
--------------	-----------------	---	--------------	---------------

OPEN
5/6/08
mvh

SUMMIT
December 7 - 9, 1987

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7

10:00am Arrival on South Lawn
11:00am First Session Reagan/Gorbachev (White House Oval)
12:00noon Working Lunch (East Room)
3:30pm Reagan/Gorbachev tour residence (social setting)
Evening State Dinner at White House

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8

[Morning Gorbachev breakfast with U.S. academic/cultural/
business leaders (include small business) hosted by
Vice President]
9:30am Morning Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev
[12:00noon Gorbachev lunch with congressional leaders]
1:30pm Reagan/Gorbachev arrive East Room for signing ceremony
(Similar to press conference format, the two leaders
walk down the Cross Hall and enter East Room)
2:15pm Reagan/Gorbachev televised messages to US/USSR
Leave East Room together and walk to Blue Room where
they are seated in chairs for broadcast (just the two)
3:30pm Afternoon Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev
Evening Soviet Dinner at Embassy ???

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9

[8:00am Gorbachev breakfast with congressional leaders]
9:30am Morning Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev
11:15am Depart White House for Mt. Vernon/Dumbarton Oaks
12:15pm Lunch
2:30pm Afternoon Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev (at lunch site)
5:00pm Departure (Vice President at Andrews)
8:00pm President addresses Joint Session of Congress/Nation

B

SUMMIT
December 7 - 9, 1987

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7

10:00am Arrival on South Lawn
11:00am First Session Reagan/Gorbachev (White House Oval)
12:00noon Working Lunch (East Room)
3:30pm Reagan/Gorbachev tour residence (social setting)
Evening State Dinner at White House

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8

Morning [Gorbachev breakfast with U.S. academic/cultural/
business leaders (include small business) hosted by
Vice President]
9:30am Morning Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev
Private Lunch
1:30pm Treaty Signing Ceremony (Rotunda of Capitol)
Gorbachev holds sessions with congressional leaders
** Reagan/Gorbachev tape statements to each others
country
3:30pm Afternoon Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev
Evening Soviet Dinner at Embassy ???

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9

9:30am Morning Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev
11:15am Depart White House for Mt. Vernon/Dumbarton Oaks
12:15pm Lunch
2:30pm Afternoon Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev (at lunch site)
5:00pm Departure (Vice President at Andrews)
8:00pm President addresses Joint Session of Congress/Nation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM ON SUMMIT ACTIVITIES

FROM: TOM GRISCOM

This is an overview of events related to the upcoming summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Listed are events that are tied into the summit and a proposed summit schedule.

Those requiring action:

- 1) Presidential session with columnists -- Friday, November 20, 11:30 a.m.
☐ Approve ☐ Disapprove
- 2) Travel date on November 24 -- en route to California tour SDI research facility and deliver general audience speech on INF
☐ Approve ☐ Disapprove
- 3) Travel date on December 1 (previously approved) -- en route speak to high school audience about arms control and its impact on future of this country. Potential location is Jacksonville, Florida.
☐ Approve ☐ Disapprove
- 4) Presidential session with network anchors -- Friday, December 4, 1:00 p.m.
☐ Approve ☐ Disapprove
- 5) Presidential press conference -- Monday, December 14
☐ Approve ☐ Disapprove

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Preparing for the Summit

Gorbachev will be here in four weeks. Our task is to use this time to achieve tangible results across our full agenda.

The Agenda

Arms Control

Even more than in past high-level meetings, the stakes as we approach a Washington summit will be highest on arms control issues. Gorbachev must understand from the events of the past weeks that what he had considered an ace -- trying to make SDI look like the obstacle to agreement -- has turned out to be a deuce. His agreement to meet without prior commitments on SDI, and the shift of emphasis in his letter to the more general question of strategic stability, suggests we have not yet seen Moscow's bottom line on Defense & Space issues. We are not likely to see it until Gorbachev arrives in town and can deal directly with you, as I told him he must.

Nor are we likely to close on the critical question of START sublimits. We have made crystal clear to the Soviets that there will be no START agreement without ballistic missile warhead sublimits which enable us to configure our forces in accordance with our needs. Shevardnadze was careful during his discussions here not to close any door. The Soviets are thus positioned to give us what we need, but will probably do so only at the highest level. As agreed when Shevardnadze was here last week, what you and Gorbachev agree to on START and Defense & Space can be recorded as guidance for our negotiators in working out treaties.

In the meantime, we will have our hands full completing the remaining INF issues -- chiefly verification details -- that are essential to a good treaty. Shevardnadze and I have agreed to monitor progress to ensure that any hang-ups are quickly dealt with, and the U.S. is well-positioned to maintain our interests in the fast-moving INF end-game. We fully expect the INF Treaty to be ready for signature.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

NLRR 104-075 #7

BY CW NARA DATE 8/15/06

In START, we will push the Soviets on verification. The Arms Control Support Group will ensure that the various options have been worked for your discussions with Gorbachev.

Shevardnadze and I agreed last week that ancillary arms control issues -- conventional, chemical weapons and nuclear testing -- can be dealt with through established channels.

Human Rights

Gorbachev's decision to come to Washington presupposes further movement in the human rights field. To minimize chances of embarrassing demonstrations during his stay, the Soviets can be expected to accelerate the resolution of divided spouse and other cases we have raised with them, and to allow emigration levels to rise further.

We should not be satisfied with token gestures. We have put down in the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up meeting clear and reasonable standards against which we will measure Soviet performance. We should continue to emphasize that only by meeting such standards will Moscow be able to remove the legacy of distrust engendered by past practices and open the way for a more normal relationship. We should also consider whether and how to use the Soviets' apparently growing desire for a clear U.S. answer to their CSCE proposal for a Moscow humanitarian conference to elicit further movement in human rights.

Finally, we should try to take advantage of Gorbachev's presence to make him face directly the consequences of Soviet human rights practices. While he would probably bridle at an official U.S. proposal, we intend informally to suggest -- perhaps through Congress -- that he meet while he is here with representatives of such organizations as the CSCE Commission and groups concerned with freedom of religion in the Soviet Union, including leading Jewish organizations.

Regional Issues

Shevardnadze and I have discussed this set of issues at length. In addition, Under Secretary Armacost will conduct an in-depth review with Shevardnadze's senior deputy, Vorontsov, in mid-November. At this point, I suggest that you plan to push Gorbachev hard on the issue of troop withdrawals -- the Soviets from Afghanistan, the Vietnamese from Cambodia, the Cubans from Angola. In addition, you may wish to reiterate that the purpose of your 1985 UNGA regional initiative was to provide a framework for the warring parties to end regional conflicts based on withdrawal of foreign forces, national reconciliation and economic reconstruction. We will need to fine tune our points for the summit based on Armacost's discussions as well as developments in the coming weeks in such fluid situations as the Gulf War and the Central America peace process.

Bilateral Issues

The expansion of bilateral contacts you launched before Geneva has continued apace, and you will be able at the summit to point to progress in a wide range of areas. I have attached a list of specific items which could be recorded or signed in Washington.

Some, notably the agreement on research in the basic sciences and new initiatives in climatic change, will require a firm push to be wrapped up by December 7. Neither is substantively contentious. But these and other similarly promising ideas could become victims of bureaucratic inertia unless you make clear the importance you attach to having something on the bilateral side to balance the arms control agenda.

Organization

The period between now and December 7 naturally sorts itself into two main phases.

- Now through Thanksgiving;
- Thanksgiving through December 6.

The first period will crest the week of November 16, when we have scheduled senior-level reviews in arms control, human rights and regional issues. Max Kampelman will kick off the process on the 16th by reviewing progress in the INF, START and Defense/Space negotiations with Vorontsov. Max will hand Vorontsov over to Mike Armacost the next day for the discussion of regional hot spots. At the same time, John Whitehead will be in Moscow for a thorough scrubbing of the human rights agenda.

On the basis of those discussions, we will be able to decide whether a meeting between myself and Shevardnadze will be necessary. I suspect it will, and have made tentative plans to go to Geneva the first part of Thanksgiving week. In any case, we should by Thanksgiving have a fairly precise picture of what the Washington agenda will look like, and where we will need to focus our attention in the remaining week.

We should aim if at all possible to have the INF agreement done by Thanksgiving. This would allow us to use the period after Thanksgiving to complete the legal formalities necessary to sign the Treaty. It would also enable us, in our preparations for Gorbachev's visit and in our public diplomacy, to focus on the START, human rights and regional issues we want to push strongly at the summit.

Consultations

Thorough consultations have been a major factor in our successful management of the U.S. - Soviet dialogue. We should give particular attention to:

-- Congress. We will want to keep the leadership of both houses fully briefed on progress in Geneva, and on our discussions of human rights and regional issues. You should plan to brief Congress in joint session following the summit. Such issues as the Symms amendment to expel the Soviets from their Mt. Alto complex will require careful management as December 7 approaches.

-- Allies and others. If I meet with Shevardnadze before the summit, I would plan to brief our NATO Allies in Brussels on my way home. After the summit, I would brief the Allies at the scheduled December 10-11 North Atlantic Council Ministerial. We would also dispatch emissaries to Asian capitals. I will be providing separately recommendations on a possible NATO summit to follow the Gorbachev visit. Mike Armacost will coordinate consultations with key regional players such as the Pakistanis, Persian Gulf States and others.

-- Human rights groups. I recommend that you plan to meet with representatives of the most important human rights groups, e.g., the CSCE Commission, the Helsinki Watch, and groups concerned with Soviet Jewry, to demonstrate our solidarity with their goals.

Public Diplomacy

The White House, State and NSC press offices should coordinate closely to get our message out most effectively. I know that you will be giving greater emphasis in your public remarks to U.S. - Soviet themes in the weeks ahead, and I may devote a speech this month to the state of the relationship. Farther ahead, a major address by you between the Washington and Moscow summits would set the stage for our end game with Gorbachev.

Bilateral Achievements (Besides INF)
To Record or Conclude at the Washington Summit

To Record (already in place)

Agreements on:

- Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
- Space Cooperation
- Textile Quota
- Design study of fusion test reactor (multilateral)

Cooperation in:

- Airport (anti-terrorist) Safety
- Health, nuclear reactor safety, environmental protection
- Expanded people-to-people activities and cultural exchanges

Progress in negotiations on:

- Alaska/Siberia maritime boundary
- Maritime affairs
- An Agreement on Cooperation in Transportation

To Be Concluded at Summit *

Signing of:

- Basic Sciences Agreement
- Maritime Search and Rescue Agreement
- Amendment to Civil Aviation Agreement (to permit wide-bodied direct PANAM service to Moscow)
- Renewal of World Oceans Agreement (expires December 15 unless renewed)
- Protocol to Housing Agreement on Permafrost construction

Agreement to:

- Global climate change initiative (under Environmental Cooperation and Space Agreements)
- Create nuclear reactor safety working group (under Atomic Energy Agreement)
- Organize a "Youth Chautauqua" under the Geneva people-to-people initiative
- Begin consultations on drug enforcement and interdiction

* NOTE: Only Civil Aviation amendment is in place as of November 6. Others have been vetted interagency, are fully consistent with Administration policy, and are within reach with Soviets, but will require intensified effort by U.S. bureaucracy to complete by December 7.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL:OADR

NLRR F04-075 #8

BY CLS NARA DATE 8/5/04

SUMMIT (December 7- 9):

DECEMBER 7

10:00 arrival on South Lawn
11:00 first session RR/MG (White House oval)
12:00 working lunch (East Room)
3:30 Reagan/Gorbo tour residence (social setting)
evening State dinner at White House

DECEMBER 8

➔ MG breakfast with U.S. business leaders (include small business)
9:30 meeting with RR/MG
private lunch
1:30 treaty signing ceremony (Rotunda of Capitol)
MG holds sessions with congressional leaders
**rr/mg tape statements to each other country
3:30 afternoon meeting with RR/MG
evening Soviet dinner at Embassy ???

DECEMBER 9

➔ MG breakfast with U.S. high school students
9:30 morning meeting with RR/MG
11:15 depart White House for Mt. Vernon/Dumbarton Oaks

12:15	lunch
2:30	afternoon meeting with RR/MG at lunch site
5:00	departure (VP at Adnrews)
8:00	RR address Joint Session of Congress/Nation

SUGGESTED EVENTS:

- November 3 / congressional briefing
- November 5 / Lord Carrington (NATO impact)
- November 12 / conservatives meeting
- November 16 / D.C. speech ; meeting with political activists
- November 17 / Republican & Democrat policy lunches
Change media from anchors to columnists
- November 20 -- pre-brief at Pentagon/go to Camp David from
Pentagon ; newsmagazines (rescheduled from 11/13)
- November 23 -- Nixon/Ford/Carter meeting; tape T'day message
- November 24 -- travel day to California
Go to location where SDI research underway, such
as Denver; do tour and then address regular
citizen lunch
- November 26 / T'day message broadcast (offer to Soviets)
- November 30 -- broad-based meeting: business, labor, etc.
- December 1 -- travel day to South
Go to high school audience and talk about future
and impact treaty will have on future citizens
- December 3 -- Kissinger, Brezinski etc. mtg.
- December 4 -- Network anchors interview
- December 7 - 9 / summit (see attachment)
- December 10 -- congressional briefing with foreign affairs and
armed services members

- December 11 -- South lawn send-off for President
- December 14 -- press conference
- December 16 -- Thatcher & Kohl and follow-up press and congressional meetings
- December 17 -- presidential candidates (Republican/Democrat) briefing

5:45 PM.

MEETING W/
GRISCOM

THEMES: The points that have to be developed are:

- INF treaty, its importance, illustration of RR leadership, impact on the future and future generations
- Ratification, success rather than failure
- Verification, stick to the agreement, good deal and can make sure stays a good deal
- SDI, sign of strength, toughness in bargaining, look to future, commitment to defend and not to offend
- START, continued look to future, the next step in removing weapons
- **This all leads to the fact that the President was patient, sees the promises he envisioned being fulfilled and looks to the future and future generations

OUTLINE:

- pre summit: focus more on the President setting the tone and direction; support comes primarily from Shultz, Carlucci, Powell, Baker, Adelman (we drive the messages)
- summit: the event that sets the tone
- post-summit: focus more on other spokesmen to talk about the positives of the treaty, what it could lead to in the future, eye toward START/SDI

THEMES: The points that have to be developed are:

- INF treaty, its importance, illustration of RR leadership, impact on the future and future generations
- Ratification, success rather than failure
- Verification, stick to the agreement, good deal and can make sure stays a good deal
- SDI, sign of strength, toughness in bargaining, look to future, commitment to defend and not to offend
- START, continued look to future, the next step in removing weapons
- **This all leads to the fact that the President was patient, sees the promises he envisioned being fulfilled and looks to the future and future generations

OUTLINE:

- pre summit: focus more on the President setting the tone and direction; support comes primarily from Shultz, Carlucci, Powell, Baker, Adelman (we drive the messages)
 - summit: the event that sets the tone
 - post-summit: focus more on other spokesmen to talk about the positives of the treaty, what it could lead to in the future, eye toward START/SDI
-

*Complete NSPG
→ California
11/27 ← 9:30-12:00*

SUGGESTED EVENTS:

- November 3 / congressional briefing
- November 5 / Lord Carrington (NATO impact)
- November 12 / conservatives meeting
- November 16 / D.C. speech ; meeting with political activists
- November 17 / Republican & Democrat policy lunches
Change media from anchors to columnists
- November 20 -- pre-brief at Pentagon/go to Camp David from
Pentagon ; newsmagazines (rescheduled from 11/13)
- November 23 -- Nixon/Ford/Carter meeting; tape T'day message
- November 24 -- travel day to California
Go to location where SDI research underway, such
as Denver; do tour and then address regular
citizen lunch
- November 26 / T'day message broadcast (offer to Soviets)
- November 30 -- broad-based meeting: business, labor, etc.
- December 1 -- travel day to South
Go to high school audience and talk about future
and impact treaty will have on future citizens
- December 3 -- Kissinger, Brezinski etc. mtg.
- December 4 -- Network anchors interview
- December 7 - 9 / summit (see attachment)
- December 10 -- congressional briefing with foreign affairs and
armed services members

- December 11 -- South lawn send-off for President
- December 14 -- press conference
- December 16 -- Thatcher & Kohl and follow-up press and congressional meetings
- December 17 -- presidential candidates (Republican/Democrat) briefing

SUMMIT (December 7- 9):

DECEMBER 7

10:00 arrival on South Lawn
11:00 first session RR/MG (White House oval)
12:00 working lunch (East Room)
3:30 Reagan/Gorbo tour residence (social setting)
evening State dinner at White House

DECEMBER 8

MG breakfast with U.S. business leaders (include small business)

9:30 meeting with RR/MG
 private lunch
1:30 treaty signing ceremony (Rotunda of Capitol)
 MG holds sessions with congressional leaders
 **rr/mg tape statements to each other country
3:30 afternoon meeting with RR/MG
evening Soviet dinner at Embassy ???

DECEMBER 9

MG breakfast with U.S. high school students

9:30 morning meeting with RR/MG
11:15 depart White House for Mt. Vernon/Dumbarton Oaks

12:15	lunch
2:30	afternoon meeting with RR/MG at lunch site
5:00	departure (VP at Andrews)
8:00	RR address Joint Session of Congress/Nation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1987

MEMORANDUM ON SUMMIT ACTIVITIES

FROM: TOM GRISCOM

OVERVIEW

With a summit between the U.S. and the Soviet Union expected in the mid-to-late November timeframe, there are some basic decisions that need to be made on strategy, themes, public diplomacy and related issues. For purposes of this plan, the focus is on ratification of the treaty that is expected to be signed. To accomplish this goal, the outreach has to be to various support groups, both those that are traditionally associated with the President and those that are viewed as adversaries. By early activity, it is possible to create an environment, through the use of identified spokesmen, to have people speaking out in support of this first step from both sides of the political spectrum. It should also be assumed that the opponents of such a treaty will be organized and will launch their attacks to prevent public acceptance of the treaty.

I. THEMES

Several weeks ago, an initial focus group was conducted to determine public attitudes about U.S./Soviet relations, possible summit themes/messages. It was learned that there is very little opinion formed to date on INF or the summit. The public expects that both sides will profit from such a summit, but that the U.S. should make sure it has something in reserve because there remain "doubts" about trusting the Soviet Union.

- A. The theme for the summit should be based on the phrase "movement" and "peace." This treaty is viewed as an initial step in a more long-term effort for arms reduction. The themes that were tested were all built off this message. These include:

- First step for peace
- Moving toward the promise of peace
- Brightening the horizon for peace
- First step in a new direction

- B. There was a general feeling that the Soviet Union will have a conventional superiority. This argues for using our NATO allies to put this fear to rest. This will be explored in more detail in another section.
- C. One final area that was reviewed in the theme testing was a "comfort" that the U.S. has something in reserve after a treaty is signed. SDI is considered such an item and there is some room for further explanation of SDI since a majority of those tested were not aware that it was a defensive mechanism.

II. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

One person should be designated to serve in this role and to coordinate all public diplomacy activities for inter-agency and other groups. The set-up should be similar to that employed for the Venice Economic Summit with a weekly schedule and a direct coordination with the White House team that is directed by Tom Griscom and Colin Powell. Plans should include the use of the President, cabinet members, outside spokesmen, and a coordination of the message that is being disseminated by the administration each week. A plan should begin within the third week of October and extend in its initial phase through mid-December. The second phase should be aimed at the post-January 1 timeframe which then will be more directed at moving public opinion to bring positive movement on the Senate for ratification of the treaty.

III. TRAVEL

At this time, it is expected that there would be two Presidential trips. The first would be October 28 to West Point with the focus being to use the U.S. Military Academy as a backdrop to set the stage for the conventional weapons debate. A second date of December 1 is being held to tentatively go to a Southern college campus to symbolize support from young people in the more conservative areas of the country. A third date, that might include NATO-related activities, is at least under consideration for the December timeframe but nothing is firm on this proposal. This could be either a trip to Brussels or a meeting at Williamsburg with the NATO leaders. In 1983, President Reagan got the other economic leaders to agree to deploy Cruise and Pershings at the summit in Williamsburg. The setting would be around mid-December with a tie-in to "peace on earth" during the holiday season.

IV. SPEECHES

There are several speeches already planned. These include:

- October 26: national address following foreign ministers meeting in Moscow
- November 3: Worldnet to speak to European community
- November 11: Veterans Day Address, Arlington Cemetery, to discuss conventional arms and enlist veterans support for INF.
- November 30: Address Joint Session of Congress

There is no public speaking event planned for the November 15 - 29 period because it is anticipated this may be the time for a meeting between the President and the Soviet General Secretary. If this is correct, there will probably be an additional speech that will be in conjunction with the actual summit.

V. PRESS

Several activities are already on the President's schedule and they are all related to the summit. Beginning on October 23 and 26 with foreign journalists and television reporters, the month of November will afford opportunities to meet with the national news magazines, bureau chiefs (newspapers), national network anchors and columnists.

VI. SURROGATES

The previous subjects have been primarily aimed at Presidential activities. A full schedule of events will be planned for cabinet members and other pro-summit advocates. These include speeches in Washington and other foreign policy forums around the country; news interviews and op-ed pieces; Worldnet and various public support group activities. In addition, each week a series of administration talking points will be available through the Office of Public Affairs at the White House. Each cabinet secretary will be asked to be available for these efforts.

Various support groups should be formed from former defense secretaries, former secretaries of state, former Members of Congress on the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees, former NSC directors, conservative leaders, veterans groups, governors, presidential candidates (both parties), former Presidents and Nato leaders.

VII. POLLING

During this period of time, there will be several DMI surveys that will give us a read on public response to up-to-date activities and positioning for longer term messages leading to the State of the Union. There will be at least three surveys conducted between this time and the State of the Union.

VII. POSITIVES/NEGATIVES

Some issues are natural plusses such as reducing the threat of war/peace. In the most recent DMI surveys, this combination rates as the top issue. Most people feel that a summit will be in our best interest, it will lessen tensions, that it will be a plus for the President and the U.S., and that it will lead to further activity in the future.

However, there are some negatives that have to be removed. Verification is the most obvious and some critical spokesmen need to be found to deal with this question. This should include private meetings, op-ed pieces and interviews. There needs to be some identified arms experts out-front on this issue. The conventional arms balance question will exist and there should be an effort to enlist our NATO allies to help work this issue both in Europe and in this country. One possible scenario is to have several NATO leaders meet with the President post-summit and then have them spend several days with members of the Senate and on various speaking tours around the country.

IX. ASSIGNMENTS

As we have seen since our arrival at the White House, unless there are assigned responsibilities, things tend to either fall through the cracks or not get done in a timely fashion. That is why it is important at this stage to make assignments and give responsibility for the functional coordination to one person. I would suggest that a weekly reporting session be held to go over the bidding for that week and to look ahead. This person will work in conjunction with the summit planning team and the Chief-of-Staff and the Director of the NSC. Listed below are some suggested assignments and some recommended timeframes for activities to be started/concluded:

- Coordinator: Rhett Dawson
- Press Relations: Dan Howard
- Media Relations: Elizabeth Board
- Public Affairs: Tom Gibson
- Policy: Bob Linhart/Fritz Ermarth
- Schedule: Fred Ryan
- Public Liaison: Rebecca Range

- Conservative Contact: Ken Cribb
- Congressional relations: Pam Turner
- Outside Coordinator: Rhett Dawson
- Travel: Jim Hooley
- Staff Support: David Chew

- Ex-officio: Tom Griscom/Colin Powell

Timeframes should coincide with activities. Such as:

- Now through October 31: Outside contacts lined up with surrogates, speakers, inter-agency personnel, conservatives, etc.
- November 1 - November 15: First series of issue papers/themes are released.
- November 15 - November 24: Summit related activities.
- November 25 - December 15: Post-summit activities that are aimed at positioning issue and active use of all surrogates for both media/substantive purposes.
- January 1 - through ratification.

X. TIME PLAN

Summit activities should be broken into three phases:

- A. October - mid-November: Presidential period.
- B. Mid-November: Summit
- C. Late-November - December: Surrogates carry message in addition to the President.

XI. MISCELLANEOUS

Here are some random thoughts that should either be approved or discarded. That will require some decisions now and efforts being made to line-up people. These include:

- A. Former Presidents post-summit
- B. Former Defense Secretaries
- C. Former Secretaries of State
- D. Outside Lobbyists
- E. Former NSC Directors
- F. Conservatives
- G. Presidential candidates (Republican and Democrat)
- H. Governors

- I. NATO leaders
- J. Veterans leaders
- K. Conservative journalists
- L. Columnists
- M. Trouble-spots: Kissinger, Kirkpatrick, etc.
- N. Negotiators: include Perle

My recommendation is that the coordinator be given the responsibility to get these accomplished and to set a deadline of October 31.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 13, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS C. GRISCOM
COLIN POWELL
CO-CHAIRMEN, SUMMIT PLANNING GROUP

FROM: HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. *HHB*

SUBJECT: GORBACHEV VISIT

John Akers, chairman of the board of IBM, called today to offer to host a dinner for General Secretary Gorbachev, inviting representatives of business, industry, retailing, services, etc. -- large and small -- to give the General Secretary a broader view of America's industrial and commercial life than he would otherwise obtain. I explained to Akers that you two co-chair the White House task force to plan for a summit, if it is to occur, and that as we moved along we would be back in touch with him.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1987

Talking Points For Senator Baker
Conversation With Secretary Shultz

- f. 6
- * Precedent set on successful planning of trips with highly personal Presidential interest and participation for White House lead role in development and coordination.
 - Unlike "cookie cutter" nature of state/official visits to Washington which are standard scenario
 - Premier Zhao Ziang, Queen Elizabeth II visits examples where President's personal support operation took lead coordination role (Involved President in strong "host" role outside standard state visit fare)
 - Previous meetings with Gorbachev (Geneva and Iceland) were result of coordination group chaired by Chief of Staff and NSC advisor and a working group of their designees
 - * Highly personal nature of a Gorbachev visit for the President requires that decision-making body be responsive to his personal hopes and aspirations for the visit.
 - * Possible reciprocal nature of trip arrangements cannot be overemphasized.
 - We can expect that trip to USSR will mirror in many ways trip to U.S. Decisions on substantive and logistical nature of trip to USSR will probably be made at very personal level around Gorbachev
 - When we need decisions on those arrangements, we need to have access to people close to Gorbachev, not those in Soviet bureaucracy
 - Example set by us may be crucial, in terms of perception of personal involvement of President and the White House. This was demonstrated by our experience with reciprocal arrangements on visit to Chinese to U.S. and our visit to China

* Overall control of schedule and events should rest with group representing all relevant agencies (State, White House, NSC, USIA, etc.); group to be co-chaired by Baker and Carlucci, as was done in past.

--Group would include Shultz designee, i.e., Roz Ridgway

--Next-level "working group" would be responsible for day-to-day implementation of decisions of Baker-Carlucci group. From White House, Griscom and Powell would co-chair. Active participation of senior State advisors crucial: Tom Simons, Mark Palmer, Soviet desk director, etc. Also, USIA, State Protocol and others

--The working group (Griscom-Powell) is responsible for substantive and protocol development of the visit

--This based on model of past successful trips mentioned above

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

FROM THOMAS C. GRISCOM *3*

SUBJECT TALKING POINTS FOR CONVERSATION WITH THE
PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN ON U.S.- U.S.S.R. SUMMIT

In an informal conversation today, Bill Henkel, Jim Hooley and I began discussing the many steps we would have to begin immediately if a Summit date emerges from the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit next week. It is clear that we will have an immense task before us, in terms of both substance and logistics, which will have to begin immediately. It is our expectation that a Soviet delegation will want to come to the U.S. to review our plans within a few weeks of an announcement. Therefore, we will have to decide very shortly what it is we want from a Summit, what we want to do, and what we want to show the Soviets.

The necessary first step is to find out from the President and Mrs. Reagan what are their thoughts, ideas and expectations. On Sunday, aboard Air Force One en route Washington from Topeka, there is a timely opportunity for you to probe for some of their thoughts. At this time, you and Frank Carlucci are scheduled to brief the President on disarmament and arms control during that flight. We recommend that you follow that meeting with an invitation for Mrs. Reagan to join the three of you for a private and informal discussion of the Summit. You should explain to them that, assuming that Schevardnadze carries a message from Gorbachev accepting his invitation, it would be immensely helpful if we had their current thoughts on these activities, and their sense of the scope of the visit. You could convey these to Bill Henkel aboard the flight as they are fresh in your mind.

For your information, we will use this information as background for a small, private preliminary planning meeting I expect to convene in Washington on Wednesday. Following my discussions with Bill and Jim, it is evident to me that an immense commitment of time, manpower and resources will need to be dedicated to this project, almost to the exclusion of other matters. Therefore, it is vital that we begin now. The key to beginning this process is learning from the President and Mrs. Reagan, in a quiet and private conversation, their hopes and aspirations for the Summit.

In short, what we need to know is: if the President could have it any way he wanted it, how would the Gorbachev visit to the U.S. go?

cc: Bill Henkel
Jim Hooley

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR BAKER

FROM: TOM GRISCOM *3*
SUBJECT: SUMMIT INFORMATION

Attached to this memorandum is a longer version with some issues that should be considered as we head into the Fall.

Earlier today I had a discussion with General Powell concerning the initial planning stages for foreign policy initiatives that may occur later this year. It is our recommendation that we go forward and designate a planning team in the White House that will pull together the inter-agency contacts.

As you recall, Colin and I already chair a U.N. planning group and our recommendation would be this group be continued, with you and Frank Carlucci as the chairmen and the two of us (Colin/Griscom) as the operational co-chairmen. This is similar to planning steps that were taken prior to the 1985 Geneva summit. One other recommendation that was used for Geneva was the designation of this planning group in an NSDD. It is our feeling that taking this action now will send a clear signal that the White House will serve as the coordinating and decision-making group for any summit-related logistical, public diplomacy etc. activities.

I would also suggest that on Sunday when you finish your conversation with the President on the other subject matter, that you raise this coordination plan for his concurrence and that you ask in general for any thoughts that they may have at this time as it relates to a summit and plans for a summit.

After that conversation, Bill Henkel could get any follow-up that needs to be put into our planning process.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM

JAMES L. HOOLE 

SUBJECT

POSSIBLE GORBACHEV VISIT TO U.S.

As I mentioned this morning, we have prepared a memorandum for Senator Baker to give to the President, summarizing our understanding of current thinking for the possible Summit trip. Bill Henkel and I feel very strongly that this should be submitted to the President, and given to Gen. Powell at NSC for Secretary Shultz and his people. This is so that everyone is singing from the same sheet of music if the subject of the Summit comes up in meetings with Schevardnadze next week.

It is possible that certain key players may have their own ideas as to what the President wants from a Gorbachev trip. This memo would serve as notice that there is one plan, and the President has approved it.

Our proposal is that Sen. Baker, if he approves the attached memorandum, submits it to the President this afternoon for perusal over the weekend at Camp David.

If you agree, we would have Colin Powell circulate a similar document (also attached), which would contain the same thoughts as the memorandum, but which would be in the form of an event concept proposal sent out to select State and NSC players. This would then constitute the paper which you indicated you would pass out to these players following our meeting on Wednesday.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

SUBJECT: INITIAL THOUGHTS ON A POSSIBLE GORBACHEV VISIT

Pursuant to our recent conversation aboard Air Force One, and some follow-up discussions with selected senior staff members, I think that it is important to have some approved concepts in hand in the event they are needed during the course of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit next week.

First, let me reiterate some of your views to ensure that we are building on the proper foundation. I believe that you would like to see a Gorbachev visit which focuses more on the American experience and American values than on a ceremonial structure. Our objective ought to be to impart in the General Secretary a sense of how Americans live and work - a sense of our everyday family community, economic and moral outlook. While playing down the Washington pomp and ceremony aspects, we should similarly avoid anything which could be labeled "Potemkin Village."

With this as a rough guideline, I have discussed the matter with others here in the White House and retrieved some data from previous experiences during this Administration which are relevant and consistent with your views.

One way to structure a Gorbachev visit might be a simple progression from East to West - that is, starting in Washington with a minimum of necessary official activity and then moving West increasing the General Secretary's exposure with several cross-country stops and ending on the West Coast. Activities under this scenario might include an Arrival Ceremony/State Dinner day in Washington, followed by a Mid-Western, Southern and/or Southwestern visit featuring industry and agriculture, and finally a visit to the West Coast.

This East-West vehicle could sustain a variety of themes - it traces the direction of this country's settlement, it would reveal the scope and diversity of the American experience and, most importantly, might provide you with the maximum flexibility to personalize the General Secretary's experience.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F04-075#9

09/11/87 12:30 p.m.

BY NOJ NARA, DATE 11/9/06

One approach would be for you to bracket Gorbachev's visit - that is, greet him in Washington in a fairly official context, and after the requisite formalities, invite him to see our country firsthand with the understanding that you would join him "at the other end" - away from Official Washington for a more personal intensive meeting. This could be structured around dual speeches to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, for example. On a still more personal basis, you might wish to "compare notes" on his impressions by inviting him to the Ranch.

One theory mitigating against this East-West approach is the unconfirmed idea that the Soviets have a great concern for the General Secretary's personal security abroad, particularly here in the U.S., and would greatly prefer the safety of their Embassy here in Washington for overnight accommodations. If this is true, and we needed to acquiesce to the concept of day trips out of Washington, we could still offer up an impressive diversity of American experience. Williamsburg for historical context could be followed by Baltimore, Philadelphia or New York for a glimpse of rejuvenated urban life, while Virginia and Pennsylvania could offer views of agriculture and industrial America. Annapolis and the Chesapeake area are also natural possibilities.

In either case, in your cordial but brief official greetings you could indicate that you wish to interact on a more personal level after the General Secretary is exposed to the America you represent.

Another possible consideration that we must factor in is the likely Soviet sensitivity to the fact that Gorbachev is neither Head of State nor Government. The omission of an invitation to The White House, or any other Washington based formality normally accorded a world leader could be misinterpreted. (I am told that this almost became a Soviet obsession during the planning for the Nixon - Brezhnev meeting in 1973.)

In a related area, I think that it is important to make the General Secretary aware that a visit to the U.S. would merit your personal attention and that you are willing to contribute to its success in any way possible. Not only would this set a beneficial tone for negotiations, but also as with the Zhao Ziang visit it could establish an invaluable precedent for your experience on any reciprocal visit to the U.S.S.R. Again drawing from the Zhao model, perhaps you should give consideration to designating a personal representative to act as your liaison in these matters as Mike Deaver did during Premier Zhao's and Queen Elizabeth II's visits.

Finally, pending your reaction to these matters, I would like to discuss them with George Shultz and Frank Carlucci. If we are of one voice and have some generally agreed upon guidelines in hand prior to the Foreign Minister's visit on Tuesday, we can meet the subject head-on, impress the Soviets with our seriousness and perhaps prompt some early responses in what might otherwise be a very fast-paced preparation period.

09/11/87 12:30 p.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1987

EVENT CONCEPT FOR POSSIBLE U.S.-U.S.S.R. SUMMIT

For use during Shevardnadze Meetings September 15-17

Pursuant to a recent conversation with the President aboard Air Force One, and some follow-up discussions with selected senior staff members, it has become apparent that it is important to have some approved concepts in hand in the event they are needed during the course of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit next week.

First, it is important to reiterate some of the President's views to ensure that we are building on the proper foundation. The President would like to see a Gorbachev visit which focuses more on the American experience and American values than on a ceremonial structure. Our objective should be to impart to the General Secretary a sense of how Americans live and work - a sense of our everyday family community, economic and moral outlook. While playing down the Washington pomp and ceremony aspects, we should similarly avoid anything which could be labeled "Potemkin Village."

With this as a rough guideline, these matters have been discussed with others here in the White House and some data has been retrieved from previous experiences during this Administration which are relevant and consistent with the President's views.

One way to structure a Gorbachev visit might be a simple progression from East to West - that is, starting in Washington with a minimum of necessary official activity and then moving West increasing the General Secretary's exposure with several cross-country stops and ending on the West Coast. Activities under this scenario might include an Arrival Ceremony/State Dinner day in Washington, followed by a Mid-Western, Southern and/or Southwestern visit featuring industry and agriculture, and finally a visit to the West Coast.

This East-West vehicle could sustain a variety of themes - it traces the direction of this country's settlement, it would reveal the scope and diversity of the American experience and, most importantly, might provide the President with the maximum flexibility to personalize the General Secretary's experience.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F04-075#10

09/11/87 12:30 p.m.

BY LOT NARA. DATE 11/9/06

One approach would be for the President to bracket Gorbachev's visit - that is, greet him in Washington in a fairly official context, and after the requisite formalities, invite him to see our country firsthand with the understanding that the President would join him "at the other end" - away from Official Washington for a more personalized intensive meeting. This could be structured around dual speeches to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, for example. On a still more personal basis, the President might wish to "compare notes" on Gorbachev's impressions by inviting him to the Ranch.

One theory mitigating against this East-West approach is the unconfirmed idea that the Soviets have a great concern for the General Secretary's personal security abroad, particularly here in the U.S., and would greatly prefer the safety of their Embassy here in Washington for overnight accommodations. If this is true, and we needed to acquiesce to the concept of day trips out of Washington, we could still offer up an impressive diversity of American experience. Williamsburg for historical context could be followed by Baltimore, Philadelphia or New York for a glimpse of rejuvenated urban life, while Virginia and Pennsylvania could offer views of agriculture and industrial America. Annapolis and the Chesapeake area are also natural possibilities.

In either case, in the President's cordial but brief official greetings he could indicate that he wishes to interact on a more personal level after the General Secretary is exposed to the America the President represents.

Another possible consideration that we must factor in is the likely Soviet sensitivity to the fact that Gorbachev is neither Head of State nor Government. The omission of an invitation to The White House, or any other Washington based formality normally accorded a world leader could be misinterpreted. (Apparently, this almost became a Soviet obsession during the planning for the Nixon - Brezhnev meeting in 1973.)

In a related area, it is important to make the General Secretary aware that a visit to the U.S. would merit the President's personal attention and that he is willing to contribute to its success in any way possible. Not only would this set a beneficial tone for negotiations, but also as with the Zhao Ziang visit it could establish an invaluable precedent for the President's experience on any reciprocal visit to the U.S.S.R. Again drawing from the Zhao model, perhaps the President should give consideration to designating a personal representative to act as his liaison in these matters as Mike Deaver did during Premier Zhao's and Queen Elizabeth II's visits.

Finally, pending your reaction to these matters, Senator Baker would like to discuss them with George Shultz and Frank Carlucci. If we are of one voice and have some generally agreed upon guidelines in hand prior to the Foreign Minister's visit on Tuesday, we can meet the subject head-on, impress the Soviets with our seriousness and perhaps prompt some early responses in what might otherwise be a very fast-paced preparation period.

09/11/87 12:30 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F04-075 #11

~~SECRET~~

BY hjt, NARA, DATE 11/9/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7658

~~SECRET~~

October 21, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM:

THOMAS C. GRISCOM
COLIN L. POWELL

SUBJECT:

John Akers' Invitation to Gorbachev

There are a number of important considerations to bear in mind regarding IBM Chairman John Akers' offer to host a gala dinner for the Soviet General Secretary at the time of a Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

First, Akers' proposal is only one of dozens of invitations to both sides that we have received in the course of the last few weeks. We are answering most of the requests as follows: that plans for a summit have not been finalized, and that we will consider proposals after we are sure the meeting will take place.

The IBM offer, however, is one of two from major U.S. high-tech firms (the other is from Apple), and as such it raises unique problems that invitations to somebody's farm in Iowa do not: for if the USG endorses one of these initiatives, or even displays support by making sure administration luminaries attend the dinner, will we not send a signal that could open the floodgates on technology transfer and investment loans? If IBM, especially, succeeds in coaxing Gorbachev to dinner, it could spell extreme discomfort for tech transfer opponents.

There are additional invitations to Gorbachev we don't know about, for, unlike Akers' proposal, many have gone solely to Moscow. Ultimately, no matter what we may say, it will be the Soviets' decision to accept or decline invitations sent directly to them. They will undoubtedly find the Apple and IBM proposals especially attractive. We shall then have to decide what is so worrisome that we need to block it. Our best hope right now is that Gorbachev, for his own reasons, wants a brief summit that won't accommodate too much of this.

For now, we suggest a brief note (draft attached) thanking Akers for his offer, but stressing that it is still premature to make specific plans for a Gorbachev visit.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Draft letter to John Akers

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

A

Dear Mr. Akers:

Senator Baker has told the staff about your very generous offer to host a dinner for General Secretary Gorbachev at the time of a possible summit meeting in the United States.

We recognize that such an elaborate evening will require extensive, time-consuming preparations. Yet we still are not sure when the next summit will take place and what activities it will involve.

We will be able to speak more definitively soon, after the Secretary of State returns from Moscow. If a summit is on, we will give your proposal serious consideration. In the meantime, we thank you, and will keep you posted on developments as they occur.

Mr. John Akers
Chairman of the Board
International Business Machines
Old Orchard Road
Armonk, New York 10504